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1. Introduction
This article examines the factors and
causes of transition in the New Economic
Policy (NEP) period of the U.S.S.R. The tran-
sition from the NEP society to the Stalin re-
gime was not merely the consequence of the
power struggle among the factions inside the
governing party, nor did it result from the
strong institutionalization of power that is in-
evitable under political and cultural back-
wardness. Despite the successive occurrence
of such events, their underlying factors have
not been explained. Therefore, it is crucial to
analyze under what circumstances, which so-
cial elements manifest themselves and how.
In this article, we intend to use an evolution-
ary approach.
Any historical society has its characteris-
tic social elements. These elements have
been inherited from the past (path depend-
ency), can manifest or conceal themselves,
and occasionally assimilate, differentiate, or
metamorphose under changing circum-
stances. Correspondingly, an economic sys-
tem is characterized by the arrangement of
subsystems (e.g., market economy, command
economy, cooperative system, and commu-
nity). The arrangement of subsystems im-
plies that assuming a system as a core, cer-
tain relationships exist between the core sys-
tem and the others, that is, they may coexist,
rival, subsume or complement each other.
Therefore, while analyzing social transition,
it is essential to elucidate the changes that
occur in the composition of social elements.
After the Revolution and the Civil War,
the Soviet government adopted the NEP to
reconstruct the ruined Russian economy. De-
spite being promoted as a“serious”and
“long-term”policy, the emergent NEP sys-
tem was too short-lived to be called a regime.
It was short-lived because NEP disharmoni-
ously combined heterogeneous elements
with social dislocation. In any case, NEP was
placed in the perilous world of disequilib-
rium ; in its embryonic stage, it had the po-
tential for various vicissitudes.
Hence, the NEP society, characterized by





its democratic socialism, did not directly de-
generate into an oppressive regime after
Stalin’s usurpation of power. Therefore, it
cannot be idealized as an alternative to the
Stalin regime. Instead, the grave inconsisten-
cies within NEP itself facilitated its mutation
into the Stalin regime1.
Hitherto, NEP has been essentially re-
garded as an alliance of laborers and peas-
ants, leading to the market equilibrium be-
tween industry and agriculture, the heavy-
handed destruction of which gave rise to the
Stalin regime. While NEP’s principles in-
volved reconciliation between strata, the
Stalin regime abandoned the reconciliatory
policy and tyrannized peasants. However,
this paper suggests that Stalin’s socialist of-
fensive against peasants was enforced only
after solidifying the foundations of power in
city-based industries. In the following discus-
sion, we would like to clarify the institutional
characteristics and intrinsic elements of the
NEP economy. Thereafter, we will investi-
gate the process of NEP’s transition into the
Stalin regime, using the categories of closed-
ness, high pressure, power relations among
strata, and social dislocation, mainly in the
city-based industries.
2. Formation of the NEP economic sys-
tem and its characteristics
The NEP economic system was never
adopted deliberately and systematically. It
was neither a system wherein“the State
controls the market economy” (Stalin) nor
was it“a planned economy with a built-in
market mechanism” (central planning with a
regulated market) in accordance with the
theory of market socialism2. Although the So-
viet government intended an“economic sys-
tem that connects state planning with mar-
ket relations and individual initiatives”
(Lenin), NEP was more a mixture of various
systems than an organic connection.
The NEP economy was an ad hoc plural
economic system that arose from allowing
market activities and providing a certain de-
gree of autonomy to each economic entity for
reviving the ruined economy at all costs. It
comprised various subsystems, including
market economy, that coexisted, competed,
and complemented each other. Undoubtedly,
the economic entities could not be com-
pletely independent, and nearly all the indi-
vidual enterprises were integrated into
trusts and syndicates. Similarly, workers
were generally organized into trade unions
with various branches and regions, and con-
sumers were affiliated to consumers’ co-op-
erations. As long as the Communist Party
was unable to manage the economy (see
Lenin’s very frank speech at the 11th Party
Congress), these organizations were respon-
sible for its management. They were
grouped together, and the administrative
machinery of the state and the Party coordi-
nated, regulated, and controlled their activi-
ties3.
Generally speaking, the fundamental social
institutions inherited by the NEP society can
be listed as follows.
() A traditional patriarchy, which bred
centralized government organizations
() Extensive and deep-rooted commune
relations
() An immature market economy and
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distorted industrial structure, compris-
ing a few gigantic enterprises (mainly
heavy industries) and numerous small-
scale enterprises unevenly distributed
across cities and villages4
() A party organization and a mass
movement
In addition, there were cooperative rela-
tions between economic organizations, trade
unions, and consumer co-operatives. At the
same time, the Soviet government had to im-
plement the slow process of modernization.
The resultant NEP society, therefore, con-
tained the following social elements.
1. Paternalism
2. Principles of commune
3. Organized mobilization
4. Cooperative relationships or corporatism
5. Modern rationalism
The abovementioned social elements are
essential ones that determine the intrinsic
thoughts and behavior patterns of members
and groups in a society. Each group’s charac-
teristic elements particularly depend on the
milieu (social environment) under which the
groups have been formed. The first element
is a coupling of dependency on others and
authoritarian leadership (enjoinment). The
second is the concept of a firm sense of be-
longing and mutual aid that was traditionally
nurtured under despotism. The third is de-
rived from the demonstrative behavior on
which the political party was originally
founded, but which became a part of the gov-
erning system when the party rose to power.
The fourth element represents an inclination
for concord and reciprocity among the soci-
ety’s groups and members. Corporatism,
wherein vocational groups or social strata
sharing common values and interests set up
a representative organization to collaborate
with superior organizations, is one form of
this element. The fifth is a foreign concept
that was introduced to Russia. This element
can be summed up as relativization of sub-
ject-object relations and bounded rationality
in end-means relations. It involves emphasis
on technology, contract principles, and con-
formity with rules.
The institutional configuration of the NEP
economy is as follows. A consultation system
from above occupies a core position. (It is for-
mally subsumed by market forms.) The ne-
gotiations between the superior economic or-
ganizations and trade unions (industrial asso-
ciations, concerned governmental offices,
and central organizations of trade unions)
mainly decide the important economic prob-
lems. The trade unions participate in the de-
cision-making of many economic problems
(including industrial plans) as well as labor
problems. Commodity transactions are
mainly conducted through top-level negotia-
tions between the producer and the con-
sumer organizations. Decisions, including
those in the other domains of the economy,
are taken based on the consultations and
consensus between the organizations and
groups5.
The apparatus of the State operates in a
parallel manner, while attempting to recon-
cile the conflicting interests of the above or-
ganizations. The Party acts openly or cov-
ertly as a curator or guardian for the resolu-
tion of challenging problems. In case of bot-
tlenecks, the Party initiative is to carry out a
９
campaign to resolve the same. Furthermore,
communal relations remain a deep part of
the society, and an original market economy
serves a complementary function. We would
like to consider the NEP system with respect
to the commodity market and labor relations.
The commodity market under NEP was
chiefly composed of the following subsys-
tems.
1. The general contracts between the
producer organizations and consumer
organizations
2. Planned distribution decided by the
administrative machinery of State
3. Free market
These subsystems coexisted with each
other. The first system featured organized,
long-term business relations, determined
through top-level negotiations between the
trusts or syndicates and the central union of
consumer co-operatives. In accordance with
its terms, each affiliated organization con-
cluded an individual contract. Thereafter,
most of commodities were transferred from
factories to the principal bases and local
branches of syndicates, from where they
were conveyed to the elementary cells of
consumer organizations via the local con-
sumer co-operative unions. However, these
negotiations frequently needed mediation
and arbitration by governmental offices (the
conciliation commission of VSNKh and Tsen-
trosoiuz, Narkomtorg). Usually, general con-
tracts were applicable to goods that retained
the balance between supply and demand,
while important producer’s goods and deficit
goods, being under the jurisdiction of Nark-
omtorg, were distributed according to plan.
The free market economy was still signifi-
cant, formally or informally, and it was of
great importance in the retail market. Al-
though it was ostensibly supposed to deal
with oversupplied commodities in a free mar-
ket, in reality, a considerable amount of defi-
cit commodities were sold at high prices.
Thus, the three subsystems coexisted, partly
in competition and partly in complement
with each other6.
Labor relations were in a similar state.
These were basically regulated by collective
agreements between labor and management
organizations. The main parties in the nego-
tiations were the central committees of verti-
cal trade unions by branch and industrial as-
sociations or chief administrations. Local
agreements, though increasing, were rela-
tively unimportant.
The labor market did not function effec-
tively, and primitive market mechanisms op-
erated for temporary employees. During
skilled laborer shortages, factories contended
with each other and attempted to lure away
workers from other factories.
The State’s direct regulations were not
sufficiently strong. Although stipulations re-
garding the minimum wage, working condi-
tion standards, quota for hiring under-aged
persons, etc., were laid down, these were not
strictly obeyed.
Even in the industries, communal relations
were deeply ingrained. Rules for hiring and
firing people were governed by a mutual aid
principle and human relationships (workers
were prevalently employed through their
personal connections)7.
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rubles)
necessarily progress well-they were often
prolonged, and reaching consensus was diffi-
cult, with many disputes and conflicts. In dis-
pute settlements, there was greater depend-
ence on grievance machinery, government
offices, or the Party. Furthermore, arbitra-
tion was preferred to mediation, because ar-
bitration released people from bearing the
responsibility for the decision. Moreover,
people were not sufficiently qualified to par-
ticipate in the negotiations, because the per-
sonnel administration was controlled by the
Party, and the manager had severe restric-
tions regarding the funds at his disposal.
Trade unions also had a fragile support base
in the laboring masses8. For instance, at the
onset of their collective agreement cam-
paign, the Moscow Party committee urged
both labor and management fractions to suf-
ficiently prepare in advance so as to negoti-
ate without conflict9. This illustrates the pe-
culiar state of the labor-management coop-
eration policies of the time.
The collective agreements concluded in
this way mostly contained compromising ele-
ments, with a slight bias in favor of labor,
clearly indicated by the simultaneous in-
crease in both labor productivity and wage
[figure 1]. However, the Party apparatus di-
rectly intervened if the dispute between la-
bor and management exacerbated.
For instance, in the event of an actual or
imminent strife due to a delay in wage pay-
ment, the Party influenced various organiza-
tions through its network to settle the situ-
ation10. In the late 1920s, the significance of
collective agreement began to decline,
whereas the State’s control over wages and
labor conditions strengthened. Planning be-
gan to assume priority over collective agree-
ment11.
In this way, the system of consultation be-
Figure1. Wages and Labor Productivity
*For 1924/25 estimates.
Sources : Promyshlennost` SSSR v 1925/26, M-L., 1927, I, p.45 ; Promyshlennost` SSSR v 1926/27, M.,
1928, I, p.44,46 ; Promyshlennost` SSSR v 1927/28, M., 1930, I, p.84, 86
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tween economic organizations and trade un-
ions formed the mainstay of the NEP system,
which was not only coordinated and comple-
mented by the State but also under the
Party’s patronage.
3. Corporate governance under the NEP
In the NEP period, state enterprises (con-
sidering trusts and syndicates as independ-
ent economic units) acted on self-supporting
accounting systems ; however, their activi-
ties were restricted in many ways. Since
they belonged to the socialized sector under
national ownership, their activities were de-
fined accordingly, and their rights to dispose
of assets, including funds, were limited.
The executive officers comprised commu-
nist managers who were frequently trans-
ferred to other positions and noncommunist
specialists who continued in employment for
long periods of time12, both of whom collabo-
rated to run the enterprises. The board of di-
rectors, being the supreme decision-making
body, generally relied on the specialists’ re-
ports while determining the management
policies13. However, the board also needed to
coordinate with trade unions and govern-
mental offices. Moreover, local party organi-
zations (province-, district-, or ward-level) in-
tervened in important issues, including per-
sonnel affairs and dispute settlements, while
the Party provided general guidance14. Thus,
state enterprises were characterized by the
consultation system, a loose vertical func-
tional hierarchy, and strong external inter-
ference, and their activities can be assessed
using the following indicators.
1. Stability
2. The degree of target attainability (quan-
titative and qualitative)
3. Improvement of employee welfare
4. Effectiveness (profitability). Although
they did not pursue profitability itself, bal-
ancing their accounts could be considered
the criterion for effectiveness.
The behavioral patterns and traits of state
enterprises are as follows.
1. Inclination for stability
2. Tendency toward cooperation and com-
promise between organizations and
groups within and without the enterprise.
In fact, the efficiency or performance of ad-
ministrators was evaluated with particular
stress on their ability to get along with the
trade unions and other organizations in
workplaces, besides their business skills.
3. Running enterprises along the line of
least resistance. This implies a preference
for measures involving the least difficulty,
among all possible choices.
4. Maintaining spares and reserves. This is
intended for securing adaptability, which
is required for stability and target achieve-
ment.
5. Evasion of responsibility and risk aver-
sion
6. Behavior characterized by subterfuge
or pretense. Managers do not have to bear
responsibility if they can keep up appear-
ances. Therefore, they do not-directly or
indirectly-undergo sanctions by the mar-
ket.
7. A pseudo market behavior. Managers
behave in imitation of the prewar Russian
economy or Western developed economies
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rather than according to market princi-
ples.
8. Dullness of reception, inflexibility of ad-
aptation, and warped reactions to chang-
ing circumstances. For example, let us con-
sider that the demand for a certain com-
modity increased. First, there would be a
delay in the reception of this information,
followed by slow information processing
and decision-making regarding the meas-
ures to be taken. State enterprises re-
spond to a change in circumstances
through a built-in reaction function while
seeking a short-term and ostensible
achievement along with a preference for
stability rather than being motivated by
profit. Therefore, they take measures that
do not involve alterations in the so-called
production assortments (ones convenient
for production), impose a tie-in sale, or
change the transaction conditions, except
for price.
Such activities of state enterprises have
resulted in numerous problems, such as ex-
hibiting precedence to quantitative targets ;
neglecting qualitative problems ; short-term
management ; delayed response and slow
measures ; non-fulfillment of orders, plans, or
projects, and so on.
Therefore, it was necessary to monitor the
activities of state enterprises and adopt sanc-
tions against them. Under normal conditions,
this monitoring was perfunctory. Excepting
for the planning and budget stages, they sel-
dom faced interference as long as their eco-
nomic activities appeared to run smoothly.
However, the enterprises were completely
overhauled if they were found to have obvi-
ous defects15.
Monitoring was carried out in many ways
and involved several stages. The planning
agency, concerned government offices, trade
union, Party apparatus, party fraction,
Rabkrin, and OGPU, all participated in this
monitoring. The production conferences, pro-
duction commissions, and temporary control
commissions monitored from below, but they
did not have much significance.
This monitoring was divided into three
stages, i.e., preliminary, intermediate, and ex
post facto stages16. Preliminary monitoring
mainly constituted the deliberation and in-
spection of the plan and the budget by the
planning agency, concerned government of-
fices, and the trade union. The party appara-
tus also unofficially monitored the process
and provided general guidance, even if it did
not participate. At this stage, external or-
ganizations were very influential, and enter-
prises were utterly swamped with vertical
and horizontal negotiations. Force was some-
times used. Intermediate monitoring was
practiced when necessary, and the party
cells and fractions played an important role
at this stage17. Ex post facto monitoring was
performed for the results of the enterprises’
activities. In addition to the organizations
mentioned above, Rabkrin and OGPU, too,
gradually began to make their presence
felt18.
More detailed investigations were made
only when the defects and deviations of en-
terprises became too noticeable to ignore, fol-
lowing which the enterprises were offered


















tions. In this way, there were several restric-
tions over the activities of enterprises, pre-
dominantly controlled by the Party.
In this way, enterprises under the NEP
lacked autonomy as regards staff selection,
finance, individual decision-making, and
other autonomous activities ; consequently,
the pseudo market mechanism had limited
regulation ability.
4. Factors affecting transition
The primary reasons behind the transfor-
mation of an economic system include a frag-
ile basis existence, inconsistency among its
constituents and internal contradictions. But
these are revealed by means of some factors.
Soviet Russia underwent a Civil War in
1918, and under the resultant unavoidable
circumstances, avant-gardism (leadership by
the elite) and pragmatism (the end justifies
the means) came to the fore, with other po-
tential elements in the background. These
elements, combined with a centralized distri-
bution and mobilization system, gave birth to
the War Communism regime. This regime,
however, did not have sustainability.
After the introduction of NEP in 1921, the
economic system underwent a certain open-
ness and relaxation of pressure, only to be-
come more closed and pressured in the latter
half of the 1920s, particularly in 1927. This
year marked the beginning of a diplomatic
collapse between the Soviet Union and Eng-
land, thus aggravating the war crisis. As So-
viet Russia’s circumstances deteriorated, the
national economy became increasingly
closed. Under such a stifling atmosphere, the
industrialization drive became full-scale after
the 14th Party Congress, and intensified pres-
sure on the enterprises and workers. Un-
doubtedly, the closing the economy and put-
ting it under high pressure facilitated the
transition.
Thus, we would like to discuss the econ-
omy’s closedness/openness and change of
pressure as factors affecting the transition.
Closedness and openness, in this context, im-
ply the leeway and the degree of control and
regulation in transactions of money and com-
modities, transfer of capital and laborers, and
Figure 2. Degree of Openness and Pressure
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exchange of information, which facilitate the
convergence or divergence of the system.
Pressure means an intense power that ob-
sesses or spurs a person to do something,
comprising spontaneously competitive pres-
sure and external, compulsive pressure19. It
reflects the degree of tension or relaxation in
a society. If the whole pie of a society is rela-
tively insufficient under uncooperative rela-
tions, pressure can be intensified. A change
of pressure can suppressive or accelerate the
appearance of social elements and function-
ing of systems.
The situation of a particular time can be
expressed as a combination of closedness/
openness and intensity of pressure [Figure
2]. The Stalin regime emerged at the height
strengthening closedness and increasing
pressure. Since then, pressure gradually re-
duced, resulting in the closed and low-pres-
sure society during Brezhnev’s time. The
stabilization of the regime diminished social
convection currents and established the
domination of technocrats and a hierarchical
social structure. Subsequently, under Pere-
stroika, the concurrent opening and relaxa-
tion revealed heterogeneous social elements
in the Soviet regime and weakened disci-
pline, which could potentially disintegrate
the Soviet Union. In the post-perestroika pe-
riod, the society was suddenly opened and
freed from pressure, leading to the spread of
greed for money and power. Thereafter, the
economy again became more closed and
pressured. In this connection, we can say
that under an open and high-pressure situ-
ation, a liberalistic capitalism may“run wild”,
while a soft-collectivistic capitalism may
“take a sinuous course”.
One more factor affecting the transition is
the changing distribution of power, namely,
the interrelations among groups like opposi-
tion, alliances, splits, or integration. The con-
figuration of social strata yields the following
major organized forces.
A) The party functionaries (apparachiki)
working in the party apparatus20
B) The staffs of economic organizations,
comprising noncommunist specialists
and communist managers or administra-
tors. Although both groups do not neces-
sarily own joint interests, the latter, if
they attach importance to economic per-
formance, are forced to rely on the for-
mer21.
C) The unionized adult laborers. The
party members who founded the trade
unions must, in theory, be responsible
for their interests22.
D) The youth who are affiliated with
Komsomol23.
Though never homogeneous, these strata
share common interests and values. There-
fore each stratum has its own preference re-
garding the goals and means of policy. As re-
gards the goals, choices include effective allo-
cation of resources, priority allocation of re-
sources, growth, expansion, stability, public
peace, concord, reciprocity, equality, and fair-
ness ; as regards the means of policy, choices
include administrative measures, campaign,
coordination, complementary measures, and
guidance.
Group A prefers high growth, priority allo-
cation of resources, and fairness (equal treat-
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goals, and it prefers administrative policy
and campaign as a means of policy. Group B
prioritizes the effective allocation of re-
sources, stable growth, etc., and prefers ad-
ministrative measures, guidance, coordina-
tion, and complementary measures. Group C
prioritizes employment stabilization, growth
with welfare improvement, concord, equal-
ity, etc., and prefers coordination, comple-
ment, and campaign. Group D prioritizes
high growth, job creation, etc., and prefers
campaign.
The NEP society was founded based on
the delicate balance of power among these
social groups. The composition of social ele-
ments characterizing it would alter with
changes in the interrelations among these
strata. In fact, the configurations between
the strata drastically changed as the rifts
among them widened in the latter half of the
NEP period.. How did this occur?
5. Collapse of the NEP economic system
In the latter half of the 1920s, the economy
was rapidly closing, and pressure was
mounting. The government intensified inter-
nal accumulation to speed up industrializa-
tion without relying on foreign capital. Con-
currently, the Soviet government adhered to
the deflation policy (hard budget constraints
in the macroeconomic scale) in accordance
with the classical equilibrium theory ; it also
pursued the retrenchment and rationaliza-
tion policy from above somewhat forcibly24.
The price trends shown in Figure 3 clearly
indicate a downslide for industrial goods, re-
sulting from the strong downward pressure.
In 1928/29, the prices took an upward turn.
Capital investment shows a tendency to in-
crease25. In 1929/30 it peaked [Figure 4]. Fig-
ure 5 reveals, based on rough calculations,
that internal resources are of great impor-
tance to industry. The industry did not re-
ceive much funding from outside (a consider-
Figure 3. Prices in the NEP period (1913=100)
Sources : Ekonomicheskii biulleten’kon”iunkturnovo instituta, 1928, №1,p.6 ; №9, p10-11 ; 1929, №1, p29 ;









































able part of resources of governmental fi-
nancing had been paid to the Treasury by
the industry)26, and even less foreign capital.
Except for the funding from the long-term
credit department, bank credit, mostly short-
term, was used as a working capital. How-
ever, a considerable amount was also sunk
into fixed capital.
Figure 4. Capital Investment (VSNKh−Planned Industry)
Sources : Promyshlennost’ SSSR v 1925 godu, M., 1926, ch. 1, p.59 : Promyshlennost’SSSR v 1926/27
godu, M., 1928, ch. Ⅰ, p.57 : Promyshlennost’SSSR v 1927/28 godu, M., 1930, ch. Ⅰ, p.14 : Kontrolinyi
Tsifry narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1928/1929 god., M., 1929 : Davies (1998), p.490
Figure 5. Investment Resources of State Industry
Sources : Promyshlennost’SSSR v 1926/27 godu, M., 1928, ch. Ⅰ, p.8, 68, 70, 72 : Promyshlennost’SSSR
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When compelled to intensify internal accu-
mulation and substantially reduce costs, the
economic organizations generally behaved
shortsightedly and followed the line of least
resistance. They were more liable to adopt
superficial measures such as ostensible cost
cuts rather than a rationalization and im-
provement of production or undertaking a
thorough organizational reform. This was il-
lustrated, first of all, by their employment
policy, by which many full-time employees
were replaced with low-cost temporary em-
ployees. As a result, the number of unem-
ployed trade unionists increased, which
weakened the trade unions. Regarding engi-
neers, the enterprises avoided employing
new graduates, who could not be immedi-
ately effective. Such a myopic policy in-
creased the number of young, unemployed
technicians. They also avoided employing
under-age persons, which became increas-
ingly expensive (juvenile workers were un-
der the protection of the law)27. In vocational
education, too, training systems such as fac-
tory schools were curtailed because they
heavily burdened the industry and took con-
siderable time, while quicker training meth-
ods were adopted to economize expenditure.
In the pursuit of practicality and efficiency,
technical education came to be overempha-
sized, at the expense of the liberal arts28.
Regarding the number of employed and
unemployed persons, the data reveal the
seemingly incongruous trend that although
the number of employees increased in pro-
portion to industrial production growth, so
did the number of unemployed persons.
Even the unemployment rates of skilled in-
Figure 6. Production of State industry and Unemployment
Sources : Ekonomicheskii biulleten’kon”iunkturnovo instituta, 1925-29, all numbers. For the number of
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dustrial workers exceeded the growth rate
until the latter half of 1928. The reasons
were as follows. Although the number of em-
ployees increased, most of these were tempo-
rary employees [Figures 6, 7]. The highest la-
bor turn-over rate, therefore, corresponded
with the highest ratio of short-term employ-
ment29. This means that unemployment in-
creased because many full-time employees
were replaced with temporary employees30.
Consequently, laborers were divided into
two opposing categories, i.e., those who
would work for a short period and those who
be employed for a relatively long time (illus-
trated by a distribution chart of the length of
an industrial worker’s continuous employ-
ment in 1929)31. The latter comprised the
cadre of employees who were difficult to re-
place.
Unemployment was a serious problem
[Figure 8]. In 1927/28 the trade unionists’ un-
employment rate exceeded 20% ; it in-
creased even in the manufacturing industry,
aggravating the conflict between labor and
management. The number of under-age un-
employed persons also increased, but since
they were not always registered in employ-
ment offices, their actual situation was even
more miserable. Eventually, there were over
one million such people, with neither jobs nor
education. The jobless youths aged eighteen
and above were correspondingly many32.
The unemployed technicians and specialists,
mostly fresh graduates, accounted for ap-
proximately 20% of them33. This situation be-
came the primary reason for the hostility be-
Figure 7. Structure of Employment
Sources : Voprosy Truda, 1927-1929, all numbers : Statistka truda, 1925, №9, p.9, 1926, №2, p.9, №4-5,
p.20, №11-12, p.14-15, 1928, №1-2, p.23, Trud v SSSR, Statisticheskii spravochnik za 1924-1925 g., M.,
1926, p.42-7 and others. For the unemployed of trade unionists, Ekonomicheskii biulleten’kon”iunk-
turnovo instituta, 1926-28 : Voprosy Truda, 1926, №12, p.9, Pravda,10 Mar. 1927 : Trud, 27 Aug. 1927 ;
28 Aug. 1927 : Izvestiia, 30 Sep. 1926
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tween old and new specialists.
In 1928, the widening rifts between vari-
ous strata set off a severe social earthquake
(beginning with the Shakhty affair)34. Against
a background of generational confrontation
and exacerbating labor-management rela-
tions, the Party apparachiki won the youth to
their side (both interests coincided in a high-
growth policy)35, and they mounted an attack
over the old specialists, who resisted the
somewhat irrational policy of accelerated in-
dustrialization both overtly and covertly, un-
der the connivance of trade unions. This at-
tack effectively weakened the foundation
and influence of old specialists.
Following this, since trade unions had
taken self-protection measures in the face of
mass unemployment of their members (they
agreed to restrict an apprentice’s wage, re-
duce the hiring quota of under-age persons,
etc), the confrontation between them and the
youth was aggravated36. The Party appara-
chiki, in de facto collusion with the youth
groups, increased their offensive against the
trade unions, after which the trade unions, as
a social force, receded into the background.
This situation is illustrated by the following
facts : the policy prioritizing industrial plan-
ning over the labor-management agree-
ments, granting a concession to the youth in
the joint directive of VTsSPS and VSNKh
concerning the collective agreement dated
November 3, 1928 and the defeat of the main-
stream faction in the 8th Trade Union Con-
gress37. In this manner, a path toward the
employment bureaucracy without counter-
balance was paved.
The balance of power collapsed under the
disunity and confrontation among the social
strata, with the Party initiative pushing a
forcible integration. The Party also held he-
gemony over economic management by in-
Figure 8. Composition of Unemployed Persons
Sources : See figure 7.





















stalling its officials in responsible posts of
economic organizations and trade unions and
positively promoting young people to higher
positions. As a result, the stable growth pol-
icy with welfare improvement was aban-
doned in favor of a hyper-industrialization
policy, regardless of economic rationality.
Thus, mass unemployment was mainly re-
sponsible for excessively high growth and in-
tense accumulation, leading to the rapid
spread of social friction. Figure 9 illustrates
the relation between unemployment rate,
growth rate, accumulation rate, investment
efficiency, and degree of social friction. Here,
investment efficiency is the marginal output
per a unit of additional investment. Gener-
ally, it increases to a certain level, after
which it gradually decreases. Therefore, pro-
gressively higher investment is required for
higher growth. Accumulation rate is consid-
ered to be a proportion of investment to the
value added. Evidently, there is a negative
correlation between unemployment rate and
growth rate and a positive correlation be-
tween growth rate and accumulation rate.
The higher the accumulation rate, the more
severe is the social friction or strife, with the
degree of friction depending on whether the
resources are internally or externally
funded. The severity of friction is also shown
in wage restrictions and coercive productiv-
ity drives. In fact, the discrepancy between
the wage growth rate and labor productivity
widened in 1928/29 [Figure 10].
A heavy handed policy was also imple-
mented in the collection of agricultural prod-
ucts ; this resulted from the rapid rise in de-
mand for foods in cities and the necessity for









































































































Nominal daily wages* (Ratio 
to the previous month)
Labor productivity** (Ratio 
to the previous month)
Wages (trend)
Labor productivity (trend)
exporting. The Soviet government adopted
an extraordinary measure for procurement,
organizing a mobilization led by Komsomol.
Without doubt, the Party deepened its confi-
dence in administrative policy after the
seeming success of the implementation of
this extraordinary method to grain collection
in 192738. Although there could be other
ways to reduce unemployment (e.g., work
sharing or stable growth with mild inflation),
the Soviet government chose the rapid
growth policy. Consequently, the people
were compelled to make further sacrifices,
such as accepting great reductions in real
wages, etc.39
In this process, the social elements consti-
tuting the NEP society were activated or
suppressed under the growing closedness
and pressure, giving rise to a new composi-
tion of society.
First, an enlightening despotism or heavy-
handed leadership (an evolved form of pater-
nalism) came to the fore40, with the domi-
nance of hard collectivism without common
interests. Thereafter, an organized mobiliza-
tion (mass mobilization or campaign from
above) was subsumed under governance
mechanisms, which sometimes exceeded the
authorities’ expectations. Modern rational-
ism was modified and served only as a tool to
manage and control the social structure,
thereby it degenerated into social rational-
ism. Corporatism virtually disappeared,
while communal relations gave away under
suppression. In this way, the NEP system
collapsed.
Figure 10. Wages and Labor Productivity
* Census industry
** State industry
Sources : Biulleten’kon”iunkturnovo instituta, 1928-29, all numbers, Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta,
Oct. 21, 1928 ; Oct. 23, 1929 : Statistika truda, 1928, №11-12, p.12
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6. Conclusion
From the viewpoint of policy, the collapse
of NEP was mainly due to the enforcement
of aggressive industrialization under the
classical market equilibrium and deflation
policies, and misgovernment with regard to
employment, education, and agriculture.
As mentioned above, the NEP economy
was characterized by a plural, consultation
system, and the economy was basically man-
aged through cooperation, coordination, or
compromise among social groups or strata.
However, this consultation system had no
solid social foundation. Neither economic or-
ganizations nor trade unions were necessar-
ily competent enough to negotiate, decide,
and execute the management policies by
themselves ; therefore, so they needed the
State to coordinate and complement their ac-
tivities, while they operated under the pa-
tronage of the Party.
Before this plural system could become
sustainable, there was a drastic change. With
the increasing closedness and pressure for
industrialization in the latter half of the 1920
s, market equilibrium and high growth be-
came severely inconsistent41. Since external
funding was ruled out, intensifying accumu-
lation was the only way to finance industriali-
zation. Under the deflation policy, enter-
prises tried to reduce expenditure and raise
funds by replacing regular employees with
low-cost part-timers, avoided employing
young specialists, and cut education costs for
short-term stability, which was a behavior
pattern of subterfuge or pretense, proceed-
ing along the line of least resistance. Enter-
prises could not afford to train human re-
sources thoroughly. Such measures caused
mass unemployment and failure in the edu-
cation of young people in the latter half of
the NEP period. Consequently, it widened
the rifts among strata and aroused enduring
hostility. The irreconcilable confrontations
among social groups brought about extrinsic
consolidation. As mentioned before, the
Party apparatchiki sided with the organized
youth against the group of specialists who
resisted hyper-industrialization. After they
held the economic organizations under their
control, the Party apparatchiki in conjunc-
tion with the youths acquired power over
trade unions. The youth organizations’ lead-
ers were also purged shortly after, and the
youths were transformed into a social group
mobilized by the Party’s will42.
After such a crucial realignment of the dis-
tribution of power in society, the specific
goals and values preferred by the Party ap-
paratchiki were sublimated into “universal
interests.” Voluntary hyper-industrialization
was prioritized above all other goals, and the
Party became a governing force, leading and
ruling all the strata to conform to the“na-
tional interest.”
In order to maintain a regime of adminis-
trative control and organized mobilization,
the concepts of“distrust” and“hypocrisy”
were institutionalized.
Thus, a plural system characterized by co-
operation and compromise among strata was
transformed into a command economy-cen-
tered system comprising an enlightened des-
potism and social rationalism.
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